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CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO NEW
YORK'S YOUTHFUL OFFENDER STATUTE
I. Introduction
New York's Youthful Offender Statute' has been described as
"humane and progressive legislation intended for the benefit of a
youth who makes his first mistake and that he should not be
branded as a criminal therefor . *..."2
In keeping with this philosophy, the statute provides a system
whereby a youth (i.e., an individual between the ages of sixteen and
eighteen) can avoid the serious consequences which result from
being convicted of a crime.' Upon determination that youthful of-
fender status should be granted, the conviction is vacated and re-
placed with a youthful offender finding.4
Prior to 1975, those youths indicted for crimes punishable by
death or life imprisonment (a class A felony), or previously con-
victed of any felony, were excluded automatically from youthful
offender consideration. 5 In 1973 a revision of the state's drug laws
had divided class A felonies into three sections (A-I, A-II and A-III)
and provided a minimum sentencing term for each subdivision.'
The 1975 amendment to the youthful offender statute recognized
this change in felony classifications. Under the new provisions,
those youths indicted for class A-I and A-II felonies continued to be
excluded from youthful offender treatment, while those indicted for
A-I felonies became eligible for such treatment.'
Recently in People v. Drummond,8 the New York Court of Ap-
peals held that the pre-1975 statute violated the due process clause
because it tied eligibility to the seriousness of the crime charged in
1. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 720.10-.35 (McKinney 1971), as amended, (McKinney Supp.
1976).
2. People v. Plath, 71 N.Y.S.2d 667, 668 (Bronx County Ct. 1947).
3. See People v. Shannon, 1 App. Div. 2d 226, 231, 149 N.Y.S.2d 550, 555 (2d Dep't), aff'd
mem., 2 N.Y.2d 792, 139 N.E.2d 430, 158 N.Y.S.2d 334 (1956).
4. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAw § 720.20(3) (McKinney 1971), as amended, (McKinney Supp.
1976).
5. Id. § 720.10 (McKinney 1971), as amended, (McKinney Supp. 1976).
6. See N.Y. PENAL LAw § 55.05(1); § 70.00(3)(a) (McKinney 1975).
7. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAw § 720.10 (McKinney Supp. 1976).
8. 40 N.Y.2d 990, 359 N.E.2d 663, 391 N.Y.S.2d 67 (1976), rev 'g in part per curiam People
v. Santiago, 51 App. Div. 2d 1, 379 N.Y.S.2d 843 (2d Dep't 1975).
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the indictment rather than the crime for which the defendant was
convicted. The eligibility criteria of the pre-1975 statute have also
been challenged on equal protection grounds9 in that one defendant
may be granted youthful offender consideration while another is
denied it, even though the defendants are ultimately convicted of
the same crime.
The 1975 amendment has done little to quiet these constitutional
challenges since it continues to base eligibility on the crime charged
in the indictment. This Note will examine the youthful offender
statute and its 1975 amendment in light of Drummond and the
conflicting lower court decisions.
II. The Development of the Youthful Offender Statute
Under New York's Code of Criminal Procedure (CCP), the fore-
runner of the Criminal Procedure Law (CPL), all youths between
the ages of sixteen and eighteen who had been indicted for a crime
not punishable by death or life imprisonment were eligible for
youthful offender status if they had not previously been convicted
of a felony.'0 The court subjected these eligible youths to a complex
investigative process that determined whether youthful offender
treatment was warranted." This took place at the beginning of the
criminal action prior to any trial or conviction.'2
The CPL replaced this cumbersome process with a streamlined
procedure that begins upon the conviction of the eligible youth. At
9. See, e.g., People v. Brian R., 78 Misc. 2d 616, 356 N.Y.S.2d 1006 (Sup. Ct. 1974), a/I'd
mem., 47 App. Div. 2d 599, 365 N.Y.S.2d 998 (1st Dep't 1975).
10. 1956 N.Y. Laws ch. 841 § 2, amending 1944 N.Y. Laws ch. 632 § 2.
11. The process included: (1) a recommendation that the youth be investigated, made by
either the grand jury, the district attorney, or the court; (2) the approval or disapproval of
the recommendation by the court, plus an order to commence the investigation upon ap-
proval; (3) the investigation, usually conducted by a probation agency; (4) the final determi-
nation by the court to grant or withhold youthful offender treatment. 1944 N.Y. Laws ch. 632
§ 2.
12. Since the determination was made so early in the criminal process, the indictment
was looked to in order to find what crime the defendant had "committed".
13. See N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAW § 720 note at 314-17 (McKinney 1971). Judge Denzer noted:
Expecially [sic] wasteful was the requirement making an investigation of the defen-
dant a condition precedent in every case to the granting of such treatment. In the New
York City Criminal Court in particular, those investigations (by probation officers)
proved prolific, time consuming, unpopular all around and expensive. And in all those
cases which did not result in convictions-a very substantial percentage of the
total-the investigations amounted, of course, to exercises in futility.
NOTES
that time, a pre-sentence investigation of the defendant is con-
ducted and the decision as to youthful offender treatment is made
according to the following provisions. If the conviction is obtained
in a local criminal court" (i.e., the lower criminal courts of the state,
including the New York City Criminal Court, and other city, town
and village courts), and the defendant has not previously been con-
victed of a crime or adjudicated a youthful offender, the treatment
is mandatory. 5 On the other hand, if the conviction is had in a
superior court'" (i.e., the supreme court or a county court), youthful
offender treatment may be granted at the discretion of the court. 7
The CPL, however, did not change the CCP's eligibility criteria,
providing that every youth would be eligible for youthful offender
status "unless he (a) is indicted for a class A felony, or (b) has
previously been convicted of a felony.' 8
Since "a youthful offender adjudication is not a judgment of con-
viction for a crime,"'" the statute provides for private proceedings"0
and confidentiality of official records.' Youthful offender status af-
fords the offender many advantages: (1) denomination as a youthful
offender, rather than as a criminal; (2) retention of qualification for
possible public employment or service in public office; (3) retention
of all rights and privileges possessed by the noncriminal; (4) contin-
ued eligibility to seek and receive a license granted by public au-
thority; (5) absence of a conviction record so that it will not be
considered in possible future multiple offender situations; and (6)
Id. at 315-16; See also R. PITLER, NEW YORK CRIMINAL PRACTICE UNDER THE CPL § 7.41 (1972).
14. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 10.10(3) (McKinney 1971). Sections 10.10-30 of the
Criminal Procedure Law contain the names and jurisdictions of the New York criminal
courts.
15. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 720.20(1)(a)-(b) (McKinney 1971), as amended, (McKinney
Supp. 1976). This mandatory youthful offender treatment has been provided in order to
reconcile the statute with Supreme Court decisions mandating jury trials where a sentence
longer than six months is possible upon conviction. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 720.25 note
at 322-24 (McKinney 1971). Other changes in the sentencing structure were made to correct
apparent abuses of reformatory type sentences. See N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAW § 720.20 note at
134 (McKinney Supp. 1976).
16. See N.Y. CRIM. PROc. LAW § 10.10(2) (McKinney 1971).
17.. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 720.20(1)(a) - (b) (McKinney 1971), as amended, (McKin-
ney Supp. 1976).
18. Id. § 720.10(2) (McKinney 1971), as amended, (McKinney Supp. 1976).
.19. Id. § 720.35(1) (McKinney 1971).
20. Id. § 720.15(2) (McKinney 1971).
21. Id. § 720.35(2) (McKinney 1971), as amended, (McKinney Supp. 1976).
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protection of the youth from public exposure due to the private
nature of the proceedings.22 The statute, basing eligiblity on the
indictment, denies these advantages to many youths and requires
them to be treated as adults.
III. Constitutional Challenges to the Pre-1975 Statute
New York State has generally led other jurisdictions in protecting
the constitutional rights of juveniles (i.e., individuals from seven to
fifteen years of age).23 Article 711 of the Family Court Act, which
guarantees "due process of law" to juvenile delinquents and persons
in need of supervision2" was enacted five years before the Supreme
Court held in In re Gault 5 that juveniles accused of a crime were
entitled to certain constitutional safeguards guaranteed by the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment." In recent years, how-
ever, the New York Youthful Offender Statute, which applies to
children no longer eligible for juvenile treatment, has been chal-
lenged as being violative of the offenders' right to both equal protec-
tion and due process because of its restrictive criteria in granting
eligibility for youthful offender treatment.27
Both the Supreme Court and state courts have employed two
tests" in dealing with statutes challenged under the equal protec-
tion clause. The nature of the statute and the classification it cre-
ates are factors that determine which test is to be used. The first
test is the rational basis test, 9 which only requires that a state show
22. People v. Towler, 30 App. Div. 2d 876, 293 N.Y.S.2d 7, 9 (2d Dep't 1968); R. PITLER,
NEW YORK CRIMINAL PRACTICE UNDER THE CPL § 7.32 (1972). Many times, however, the
proceedings remain open to the public despite the statute. See Levine, The Youthful Offender
Under the New York Criminal Procedure Law, 36 ALBANY L. REv. 241, 255 (1972).
23. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 712(a) (McKinney 1975).
24. Id. § 711 (McKinney 1975), as amended, (McKinney Supp. 1976).
25. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
26. Id. 12-31; See also N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 711 note at 548-550 (McKinney 1975); 1 L.
PAPERNO AND A. GOLDSTEIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IN NEW YORK § 314 (rev'd ed. 1971).
Nor are juveniles the only class that has benefited from this concern in New York in
providing due process safeguards. In 1975 an amendment to the corrections law required that
prisoners who were denied parole be notified in writing of the reasons for such denial. N.Y.
CORREC. LAW § 214 (McKinney Supp. 1976), noted in Lewin, Criminal Procedure, 27 SYRACUSE
L. REv, 69, 136 (1976).
27. See text accompanying note 18 supra.
28. See Note, The New Equal Protection-Substantive Due Process Resurrected Under
A New Name?, 3 FORDRAM URBAN L.J. 311, 315 (1975).
29. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970).
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a "fair and substantial relationship" between the purported object
of the statute and the questioned classifications made by the legisla-
tion. This is the test traditionally utilized in examining challenged
statutes °.3  However, if the statute affects a fundamental right, 31 or
is based on a "suspect" classification,32 a stricter test is employed;
the state is required to show that a "compelling state interest" is
being advanced. 33
Where the individual's right to life, liberty or property is involved,
due process requires that a "reasonable connection" be shown be-
tween the statute and the welfare and safety of the public.34 In cases
of fundamental rights, however, the courts once again require that
regulation limiting these rights may be justified only by a
"compelling state interest. ' 3
Constitutional challenges to the youthful offender statute have
been raised in several New York cases, with differing results. People
v. Brian R.3 considered the pre-1975 youthful offender eligibility
provision. Justice Leon Polsky found it constitutionally impermiss-
able to use the level of crime charged in the indictment as the basis
for determining youthful offender eligibility.37 The court noted that
30. Note, supra note 28, at 313-14.
31. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel.
Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
32. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (classification by race).
33. Id.; Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).
34. People v. Santiago, 51 App. Div. 2d 1, 9, 379 N.Y.S.2d 843, 853 (2d Dep't 1975); People
v. Gillson, 109 N.Y. 389, 401, 17 N.E. 343, 347 (1888). See also Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S.
312, 332 (1921).
35. People v. Santiago, 51 App. Div. 2d 1, 10, 379 N.Y.S.2d 843, 853 (2d Dep't 1975)(cita-
tions omitted). See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973); Kramer v. Union Free School Dist.,
395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969).
36. 78 Misc. 2d 616, 356 N.Y.S.2d 1006 (Sup. Ct. 1974), aff'd mem., 47 App. Div. 2d 599,
365 N.Y.S.2d 998 (1st Dep't 1975). See also People v. Charles S., 79 Misc. 2d 1058, 361
N.Y.S.2d 848 (Sup. Ct. 1974). Here, an eighteen year old defendant was indicted for a class
A felony arising out of a sale of drugs. The state contended that only a defendant who has
been convicted of less than a class A felony has standing to challenge the eligibility provision's
unconstitutionality. Justice Polsky, the same judge who wrote the opinion in Brian R, re-
jected this contention and held that this argument ignores the due process challenge that the
legislature is without the power to withhold youthful offender treatment based on the offense
charged. The court also noted that to say that a person ultimately convicted of a class A felony
is without standing to challenge assumes that the statute denies youthful offender treatment
to those convicted rather than indicted for class A felonies, a situation which was not pre-
sented by the statute as written. Id. at 1059-60, 361 N.Y.S.2d at 849-50.
37. 78 Misc. 2d at 619, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 1010.
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the purpose of an indictment was to notify the defendant and estab-
lish jurisdiction over him. The opinion conceded that in some cases
the level of the offense charged could give rise to ancillary conse-
quences, such as the availability of the jury trial, but concluded that
in no case was it permissible for these consequences to have effect
beyond the final judgment of the court.3" Justice Polsky decided
that basing youthful offender eligibility on untested allegations vio-
lated due process and gave "independent existence" to the indict-
ment. In effect, the accusations in the indictment, rather than the
determination of guilt, controlled the defendant's treatment after
conviction." In rejecting this basis the court noted "[u]ltimately
.. . the penalties prescribed for particular offenses must depend
upon the crime of which the defendant is convicted, not the offense
with which he was originally charged."40
The court also found the eligibility criteria defective on equal
protection grounds.4 It could not conceive of a rational basis for
treating youths convicted of the same crime differently, simply be-
cause one might be indicted for a class A felony and the other for a
lesser offense. Justice Polsky branded the statutory classification
"utterly capricious and irrational."'" For the first time, the eligibil-
ity excepting provision of the youthful offender statute, which had
remained basically unchanged since its inception in 1943,11 was
found to be unconstitutional.
These same issues were also considered in People v. Goodwin."
The trial court had denied defendant's motion for youthful offender
treatment because he was indicted for murder, a class A felony.4"
38. Id. at 618, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 1008-09. Justice Polsky further noted that in New York,
every count in the indictment includes every possible lesser offense, and that a motion to
dismiss because of insufficient evidence before the grand jury must be denied if there is
"sufficient evidence to sustain a lesser included offense even though the evidence might be
insufficient to sustain the actual offense charged." Id. at 619, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 1009. The court
concluded from this procedure that even at this early stage in the criminal process, an
indictment charging a class A felony can be upheld though there is only sufficient evidence
to support a lesser crime. Id. at 619, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 1009-10.
39. Id., 356 N.Y.S.2d at 1010.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 619-20, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 1010.
42. Id. at 620, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 1010.
43. 1943 N.Y. Laws ch. 549 § 1 (reenacted in a separate title by 1944 N.Y. Laws ch. 632
§ 2). See text accompanying note 10 supra.
44. 49 App. Div. 2d 53, 378 N.Y.S.2d 82 (3d Dep't 1975).
45. Id. at 54, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 83-84.
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Ultimately, defendant was convicted of criminally negligent homo-
cide, a class E felony. The appellate division upheld the statute
against due process and equal protection challenges. Finding the
eligibility provision valid, the third department noted that the stat-
utes of other jurisdictions making similar distinctions" "have pre-
viously been found to be immune from constitutional attack on...
[due process and equal protection] grounds, particularly in view of
the strong presumption of validity which attaches to legislative clas-
sifications." 7
Defendant argued that the statute's prohibition against youthful
offender treatment should be applied only in cases of class A felony
convictions rather than indictments." The court pointed out that
this argument conceded the rationality of withholding the procedure
from certain defined classes (i.e., those convicted of class A felon-
ies), and of denying it to those previously convicted of felonies." The
court found that the provision basing eligibility on the indictment
carried out the similar legislative interest of limiting the availability
of the procedure in a rational manner."
In his dissenting opinion," Justice Louis Greenblott contended
that the eligibility provision violated the equal protection clause. In
an argument similar to Justice Polsky's in Brian R.,12 Justice Green-
blott could find "no rational basis for an inequality of treatment
amongst youths who have been convicted of the same offense merely
because one of them had originally been charged with a higher
crime."53 He found further support for his argument in the newly
enacted CPL.5" Under the CPL procedure, the youthful offender
46. See, e.g., D.C. Code Encyl. § 16-2301(3)(A) (West Supp. 1970), amending D.C. Code
Encyl. § 16-2301 (West 1966).
47. 49 App. Div. 2d at 55, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 84, citing United States v. Bland, 472 F.2d
1329 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 909 (1973); see Long v. Robinson, 316 F. Supp.
22 (D. Md. 1970), aff'd, 436 F.2d 1116 (1971).
48. 49 App. Div. 2d at 54, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 84.
49. See text accompanying note 18 supra.
50. 49 App. Div. 2d at 55, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 85. The court noted that the eligibility provi-
sion also indirectly serves the public's right to be informed of serious crimes which have been
committed, since without youthful offender status, the proceedings remain open to public
scrvtiny. Id., 378 N.Y.S.2d at 85.
51. 49 App. Div. 2d at 55-58, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 85-87.
52. See text accompanying notes 36-42 supra.
53. 49 App. Div. 2d at 57, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 86.
54. See text accompanying notes 10-18 supra.
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determination is made after conviction. Thus, Justice Greenblott
concluded that no rational basis exists for denying the treatment
because of the offense charged in the indictment. 5
The most recent case dealing with the constitutionality of the
former statute is People v. Drummond. " In a brief per curiam opin-
ion the court of appeals declared "limitations in CPL 720.10 condi-
tioning eligibility for youthful offender treatment on the highest
count of the indictment . . . unconstitutional."57 The court refused
to make an equal protection analysis, but found that the statute
violated due process.5" In doing so, it reversed the appellate divi-
sion's decision in People v. Santiago" and specifically adopted the
"applicable" portions of Justice Samuel Rabin's dissenting opin-
ionA0 Justice Rabin had contended that an indictment should not
55. 49 App. Div. 2d at 57, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 87.
56. 40 N.Y.2d 990, 359 N.E.2d 663, 391 N.Y.S.2d 67 (1976), rev'g in part per curiam
People v. Santiago, 51 App. Div. 2d 1, 379 N.Y.S.2d 843 (2d Dep't 1975).
57. 40 N.Y.2d at 992, 359 N.E.2d at 664, 391 N.Y.S.2d at 68.
58. Id.
59. 51 App. Div. 2d 1, 379 N.Y.S.2d 843 (2d Dep't 1975). The Santiago decision resolved
a split that existed among the lower courts in the second department. In People v. Estrada,
80 Misc. 2d 608, 364 N.Y.S.2d 332 (Sup. Ct. 1975) defendant was indicted for a class A-IT
and A-III felony for the sale of drugs and was convicted at trial. In rejecting defendant's due
process and equal protection arguments, the court pointed to the statutes of other jurisdic-
tions which use the crime charged as the standard of eligibility 18 U.S.C. §§ 5031-37 (1970),
as amended, (Supp. V, 1975); D.C. Code Encyl. § 16-2301(3) (A) (West Supp. 1970); MD. CTS.
& JUn. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-804 (Supp. 1976)). The court further noted that legislative
enactments are presumed to be valid, until their invalidity is shown beyond a reasonable
doubt and the legislature is presumed to have investigated a matter and found facts necessary
to support the questioned legislation. Id. at 610, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 234-35. In People v. Ruben
S., 81 Misc. 2d 305, 365 N.Y.S.2d 426 (Sup. Ct. 1975), defendant was indicted for the criminal
sale of a controlled substance (cocaine), a class A-II felony. The court reviewed the history
of the 1973 narcotics law which made the sale or possession of all controlled substances a class
A felony: "The history of the youthful offender law indicates that that statute was not
originally intended to deal with drug-related crimes and is now inflexible in connection with
what might be considered a minor crime." Id. at 308, 365 N.Y.S.2d at 429. The court then
refused to follow the holding in People v. Estrada and cited approvingly to the Brian R. case.
See text accompanying notes 36-42 supra. The court also noted that the Federal Delinquency
Act (18 U.S.C. §§ 5031-42) had been replaced by the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
Prevention Act of 1974 (18 U.S.C. § 5031) which eliminated any classification that forbade
eligibility on the basis of the crime charged. Id. at 311, 365 N.Y.S.2d at 431-32. The court
then concluded: "Buttressed by logic, motivated by justice and persuaded by appellate au-
thority, this court can reach but one conclusion-that is, to remove the constitutional infirm-
ity of CPL 720.10 that would deny to this defendant the opportunity to have him considered
a youthful offender." Id. at 313, 365 N.Y.S.2d at 433.
60. 51 App. Div. 2d at 14-16, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 857-59.
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be relied on in fixing the treatment of a youth following conviction,
since its function is exhausted when the trial is complete." He could
find "no reasonable justification or necessity" for basing eligibility
on the crime charged. "By according a decisive role in the determi-
nation of which youths are eligible for youthful offender treatment
to nothing more substantial than a written statement of unproven
allegations. . . the statute offends reasonable notions of fairness."8
61. Id. at 15, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 858.
62. Id. Justice Rabin stated further that an indictment "should play no part in determin-
ing the type of postconviction treatment accorded to youngsters otherwise eligible for youth-
ful offender consideration .... " Id. (emphasis added). However, in People v. Drayton, 47
App. Div. 2d 952, 367 N.Y.S.2d 506 (2d Dep't 1975), aff'd, 39 N.Y.2d 580, 350 N.E.2d 377,
385 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1976), the court of appeals held that it was proper for the judge to take into
account the charge in the indictment in the exercise of his discretion as to whether youthful
offender treatment should be granted to a particular youth. The defendant was indicted on
a felony charge, but was allowed to plead guilty to a misdemeanor. Under the provisions of
section 720.20 of the Criminal Procedure Law, an otherwise eligible youth who is charged with
a misdemeanor and convicted in a local criminal court is automatically granted youthful
offender status, provided that he has not been previously convicted of a crime or adjudged a
youthful offender. See N.Y. CRIM. Paoc. LAw § 720.20(1)(a) (McKinney 1971), as amended,
(McKinney Supp. 1976). Since superior courts in New York have exclusive jurisdiction over
felonies, the defendant was tried in supreme court and denied the automatic granting of
youthful offender treatment. Furthermore, that court, after receiving an unfavorable proba-
tion report, exercised its discretion and refused to grant the defendant youthful offender
status. Defendant alleged that this denied him equal protection in that the determination to
automatically grant youthful offender treatment should not depend on what court he is tried
in, especially since the crime to which he pleaded guilty was a misdemeanor, and triable in
a local criminal court. 39 N.Y.2d at 583, 350 N.E.2d at 378, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 2. The court of
appeals found a rational basis for treating differently one indicted for a misdemeanor and
one indicted for a felony. The legislature made a valid determination, said the court, in cases
where youths are indicted for felonies that "youthful offender status should be conferred only
in the court's discretion upon due consideration of the youth's background and prior history
of involvement with the law." 39 N.Y.2d at 585, 350 N.E.2d at 380, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 4.
The district court disagreed, however, granted a writ of habeas corpus and found that the
provisions of section 720.20(1) of the CPL violated the equal protection clause. 423 F. Supp.
786 (E.D.N.Y. 1976). The court rejected the rational bases suggested by the state (i.e., greater
seriousness of charges brought in supreme court, availability of jury trial in supreme court,
and judicial economy or efficiency), in explaining the differences in treatment for potential
youthful offenders in supreme court and in criminal court. The district court then ordered
that defendant's adult conviction be vacated and replaced by a youthful offender finding. Id.
at 792-93.
In a related case, United States ex rel. Frasier v. Casscles, 531 F.2d 645 (2d Cir. 1976),
deferldant, sentenced as a second felony offender, applied for a writ of habeas corpus to set
aside his previous conviction because of the unconstitutionality of the New York youthful
offender statute. Defendant had been charged with several crimes of less than a class A level,
but was allowed to plead guilty to one class D felony, and his motion to be accorded youthful
offender treatment was denied. Id. at 645-46. The court, in interpreting section 913-g of the
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The appellate division majority opinion had upheld the statute on
both due process and equal protection grounds. 3 Justice James
Hopkins concluded that the traditional due process test normally
required only a "reasonable connection between the statute and the
promotion of the safety and welfare of the community."" Finding
no suspect classifications or fundamental interests involved, 5 the
court also decided that the statute must satisfy the rational basis
rather than the stricter "compelling state interest" test.6 Noting the
presence of many necessary and discretionary choices inherent in
the criminal process, 7 the majority reasoned that the statute satis-
fied an administrative purpose by fixing an objective standard. The
court concluded that "[t]he finding of the Grand Jury that suffi-
cient evidence existed to justify the return of an indictment . . . of
a class A felony provided a clear and permissible expression of the
goal of the Legislature to deny to youths charged with those crimes
the benefits of youthful offender process . .6.8.
In Drummond, the court of appeals resolved the conflict over the
validity of the eligibility provisions of the former youthful offender
old CCP said that the "court, could in its discretion, deny youthful offender treatment and
the nature of the crime charged could be considered as a determining factor." Id. at 647
(citations omitted). The court compared the grant or denial of youthful offender status to
sentencing where courts have wide discretion. Id. The Drayton and Frasier cases can be
distinguished from others under consideration because'here the defendant was given the
benefit of the court's discretion which validly took into account the charge in the indictment
as one factor in determining eligibility. Section 720.10(2) of the CPL, though, allows no
discretion by the court and denies eligibility solely on the basis of a class A felony indictment.
63. 51 App. Div. 2d at 14, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 857.
64. Id. at 9, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 852.
65. The court noted: "[W]e view the claim of lack of substantive due process as sub-
sumed under the more critical claim of the breach of equal protection of the laws." Id. at 10,
379 N.Y.S.2d at 853.
66. The court said: "Clearly, the statute does not. . . touch a suspect classification based
on race, religion or national origin. Nor do we think that it falls within . . . interests of
fundamental importance, though this construction presents a closer issue. Differences in
treatment of criminal offenders have been considered not to affect an interest of fundamental
concern . I.." d. at 11, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 854, citing Marshall v. United States, 414 U.S. 417
(1974); McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263 (1973); United States ex rel. McGill v. Schubin,
475 F.2d 1257 (2d Cir. 1973).
67. For example, the prosecutor decides who to charge and at what level, the grand jury
decides to vote an indictment or not and the petit jury returns a guilty or not guilty verdict
for the crime charged or for a lesser one. 51 App. Div. 2d at 12-13, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 855-56,
68. Id. at 14, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 856.
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statute. The majority opinions in Goodwin"5 and Santiago7 ° had re-
lied heavily on the presumption of validity which attaches to a
classification reviewed under the traditional rational basis test. But
the courts in Drummond and in Brian R.7 1 could not conceive of an
adequate reason why eligibility for youthful offender treatment
should rest on the charge in the indictment."
IV. The 1975 Amendment
The 1975 amendment to the youthful offender statute resulted
from the 1973 narcotics law changes, which Governor Rockefeller
requested to combat the widespread sale of dangerous drugs. 73 That
legislation divided class A felonies into three classes (A-I, A-I and
A-III) and made the sale or possession of controlled substances a
class A felony, in order to preclude the offender from eligibility for
youthful offender status.74 Thus, a wide range of drug related offen-
ses were included in the class A felony system, along with the more
traditional serious violent crimes, all of which precluded the indi-
vidual from youthful offender treatment.75
Soon after this law was passed, the first constitutional attacks on
the pre-1975 youthful offender statute were launched.76 Many courts
were disturbed by the realization that youths indicted for relatively
minor crimes (e.g., the sale of a minimal amount of cocaine) would
be branded as criminals for their entire lives.77 As a direct reaction
to this situation, the 1975 amendment to the youthful offender eligi-
bility provision was passed.78 It represented a compromise between
69. 49 App. Div. 2d at 55, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 84.
70. 51 App. Div. 2d at 9, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 852-53.
71. See text accompanying notes 36-42 supra.
72. See 40 N.Y.2d at 992, 359 N.E.2d at 664, 391 N.Y.S.2d at 67; 78 Misc. 2d at 619, 356
N.Y.S.2d at 1010.
73. See Messages of the Governor, N.Y. Sess. Laws 2317-19 (McKinney 1973).
74. Id. at 2319; N.Y. PENAL LAW § 220 (McKinney Supp. 1976).
75. See People v. Ruben S., 81 Misc. 2d 305, 308, 365 N.Y.S.2d 426, 429 (Sup. Ct. 1975).
76. See, e.g., People v. Brian R., 78 Misc. 2d 616, 356 N.Y.S.2d 1006 (Sup. Ct. 1974), aff'd
mem., 47 App. Div. 2d 599, 365 N.Y.S.2d 998 (lst Dep't 1975). One court noted:
"Unquestionably, the effect of the stringent narcotics laws has induced the assault upon the
constitutionality of the statute." People v. Santiago, 51 App. Div. 2d 1, 6, 379 N.Y.S.2d 843,
849-50 (2d Dep't 1975).
77. See, e.g., People v. Ruben S., 81 Misc. 2d 305, 308, 365 N.Y.S.2d 426, 429 (Sup. Ct.
1975).
78. A memorandum accompanying the new amendment provides:
Class A-11 felonies were inserted into the penal law during the 1973 legislative session
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allowing youthful offender eligibility to all class A felons, and deny-
ing it in all cases of sale and possession of certain amounts of con-
trolled substances. The new amendment provides: 'Eligible youth'
means a youth who is eligible to be found a youthful offender. Every
youth is so eligible unless he (a) is indicted for a class A-I or class
A-II felony, or (b) has previously been convicted and sentenced for
a felony. 5Trhose indicted for class A-III felonies and those previously
convicted as felons, who were subsequently sentenced as youthful
offenders, are now eligible for youthful offender consideration.
In 1976 this new amendment was also declared unconstitutional
by the supreme court, Kings County, in People v. Evelyn R.'" De-
fendant, indicted on a drug related class A-I felony, was allowed to
plead guilty to a class A-III felony. Justice Jacob Lutsky granted
youthful offender status in spite of the statute and declared that this
new legislative act only compounded the unconstitutionality of the
former statute." The court could find no rational basis for selecting
only class A-III felons as suitable for special consideration. Justice
Lutsky noted that the legislative memorandum 2 accompanying the
1975 bill made no mention of minimum sentences, the distinguish-
ing feature among classes of A felonies. On this basis he concluded
that all youths faced with a maximum mandatory life sentence (i.e.,
all youths charged with class A felonies) should be accorded the
same consideration as youthful offenders.83 Furthermore, to base
eligibility upon the indictment negates the presumption of inno-
cence to which the defendant is entitled. Such a procedure is inher-
ently suspect. 4 Finally, the court echoed the sentiments of Brian
R. and Drummond"6 in commenting, "[slince when does a mere
as a response to the appeal for tough drug laws. As such, they penalized the youthful
seller or possessor of narcotics and other drugs with mandatory life sentences. Courts
should be given the discretion to allow youthful offender treatment for those
individuals which presently exist for those who are accused of more serious crimes.
Quoted in People v. Evelyn R., 85 Misc. 2d 872, 878, 379 N.Y.S.2d 1000, 1006 (Sup. Ct. 1976).
It seems clear that the Legislature had in mind situations.such as the one in People v. Ruben
S., 81 Misc. 2d 305, 365 N.Y.S.2d 426 (Sup. Ct. 1975).
79. N.Y. CuM. PRoc. LAw § 720.10(2) (McKinney Supp. 1976).
80. 85 Misc. 2d 872, 379 N.Y.S.2d 1000 (Sup. Ct. 1976).
81. Id. at 880, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 1008.
82. See note 78 supra.
83. 85 Misc. 2d at 876-79, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 1006-07.
84. 85 Misc. 2d at 876-77, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 1005.
85. See text accompanying notes 36-42 supra.
86. See text accompanying notes 56-60 supra.
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indictment preclude a defendant from being able to shed the stigma
of being labled a 'criminal'?. . . This court declares the answer to
be never.""7
The court of appeals decision in Drummond has invalidated the
exclusion criteria of the former youthful offender statute. This deci-
sion signals the end of the use of the indictment as the sole basis
for withholding youthful offender eligibility under the 1975 amend-
ment"8 and calls for the eventual affirmation of the Evelyn R. ruling.
While it is constitutionally permissible to use the indictment as a
factor in determining the court in which the defendant will be tried
and in determining whether youthful offender consideration should
be granted," it is clearly unfair to deny such treatment solely on the
basis of the accusatory instrument.
V. The Law of Other Jurisdictions
Several New York courts have pointed to the statutes of other
jurisdictions0 in attempting to uphold the constitutionality of the
youthful offender eligibility criteria. These "similar statutes
making like distinctions"'" generally set up a procedure whereby
youths charged with certain serious crimes are treated as adults
rather than tried in a separate juvenile court system.
In United States v. Bland," the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia upheld provisions of the District of
Columbia Code against due process and equal protection chal-
lenges. The District of Columbia Code grants the family court juris-
diction over any "child" alleged to have committed delinquent acts.
A "child" is anyone under the age of eighteen who has not been
charged with certain crimes by the United States Attorney. If the
person is over eighteen years of age, or over sixteen and charged with
87. 85 Misc. 2d at 883, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 1011.
88. See text accompanying note 79 supra.
89. See note 62 supra.
90. See, e.g., People v. Estrada, 80 Misc. 2d 608, 611-13, 364 N.Y.S.2d 332, 336-38 (Sup.
Ct. 1975); People v. Goodwin, 49 App. Div. 2d 53, 54-55, 378 N.Y.S.2d 82, 84 (3d Dep't 1975).
91. People v. Goodwin, 49 App. Div. 2d at 54, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 84.
92. 472 F.2d 1329 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 909 (1973). Though the opinion
of the federal court is not binding on the local District of Columbia court, the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals, in Pendergast v. United States, 332 A.2d 919, 923 (D.C. 1975),
adopted the ruling in Bland as the correct law.
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one or more of the listed felonies, he is prosecuted in the adult court
system ."
In United States v. Bland a sixteen year old defendant had been
arrested and indicted as an adult. The district court dismissed the
indictment saying that due process required a hearing to determine
whether the youth was beyond the help of the juvenile system before
he could be tried as an adult. 4 In reversing the district court the
court of appeals examined the legislative history of the statute and
decided that Congress had established sufficient facts to make such
a classification." The court also relied on the "long and widely
accepted concept of prosecutorial discretion"" in bringing an indict-
ment, and said that such a concept is not usually reviewable by the
courts. Finally, the court rejected defendant's contention that the
action of the United States Attorney in bringing the indictment
denied the presumption of innocence since, "[iut in no manner
relieves the Government of its obligation to prove appellee's guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt." 7 A strong dissent was filed by Judge
Skelly Wright,9" deploring the "out of sight-out of mind" attitude
which the majority seemed to be taking by placing juvenile offend-
ers in adult prisons "with hardened criminals."9 Judge Wright
doubted that such an attitude was in the best interest of the juvenile
or society.9 0
In Johnson v. State,'' the Supreme Court of Florida found that
93. 16 D.C. Code § 2301(3)(A) (1973) provides:
The term "child" means an individual who is under 18 years of age, except that the
term "child" does not include an individual who is sixteen years of age or older and -
(A) charged by the United States Attorney with (i) murder, forcible rape, burglary
in the first degree, robbery while armed, or assault with intent to commit any such
offense, or (ii) an offense listed in clause (i) and any other offense properly joinable
with such offense;
(B) charged with an offense referred to in sub paragraph (A)(i) and convicted by plea
or verdict of a lesser included offense . ...
94. 472 F.2d at 1333.
95. Id. at 1331-34.
96. Id. at 1335.
97. Id. at 1338. Another factor which prompted the court to uphold the statute was the
absence of any initial jurisdiction in the juvenile court over the defendant due to the unique
wording of the provision. See note 93 supra.
98. 472 F.2d at 1338-50.
99. Id. at 1349.
100. Id. at 1349-50.
101. 314 So. 2d 573 (Fla. 1975).
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no constitutional rights were impaired by a statute which provided
that any "child" indicted by a grand jury for a crime punishable by
death or life imprisonment be subjected to the jurisdiction of the
adult court. 0 Defendant, fifteen years of age, was indicted for grand
larceny and robbery, each of which carried a maximum potential
sentence of life imprisonment. He contended that some children
charged with such crimes are indicted and handled as adults, while
others are not indicted and thus are treated as juveniles. 0 The court
found that such a provision was "within the scope of legislative
authority allowed under. . the Florida Constitution."",4 The court
also rejected defendant's due process claim by finding that every
child tried under the Florida statute is guaranteed the same sub-
stantive and procedural rights as one tried in the usual manner. In
addition, it concluded that the absolute discretion of the state attor-
ney in choosing to prosecute is "inherent in our system of criminal
justice," and does not result in a violation of equal protection.15
Finally, in Myers v. District Court for the Fourth Judicial
District, 05 the Supreme Court of Colorado declared constitutional
a statute which allowed the district attorney to file a felony informa-
tion against a juvenile in adult court if the juvenile had been pre-
viously adjudicated a delinquent within the preceding two years due
to the commission of certain acts.0 7 Again, the court relied heavily
on the "broad discretion granted to the district attorney" in reject-
ing defendants' due process and equal protection claims.' 8
A comparison between the New York youthful offender eligibility
provision and the statutes of the District of Columbia, Florida and
Colorado shows many similarities. Initially, the juveniles under
these statutes are comparable to the "eligible youth" of the youthful
102. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.02(5)(c) (West 1974) provides in part:
A child of any age charged with a violation of Florida law punishable by death or by
life imprisonment shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the court. . . unless and until
an indictment on such charge is returned by the grand jury in which event and at which
time the court shall be divested of jurisdiction under the statute and the . . . child
shall be handled in every respect as if he were an adult.
103. 314 So. 2d at 574-75.
104. Id. at 577.
105. Id.
106. 184 Colo. 81, 518 P.2d 836 (1974).
107. CoLO. Ray. STAT. § 19-1-103(9)(b)(II) (1974). The provisions are set out at 184 Colo.
at 83 n.1, 518 P.2d at 837 n.1.
108. 184 Colo. at 85-86, 518 P.2d at 838-39.
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offender act, ,09 since anyone charged with certain crimes is automat-
ically excluded from the benefits of either the juvenile system or the
youthful offender procedure. More importantly, it is the charge con-
tained in the indictment which determines how a defendant will be
treated. The New York statute has been criticized for handling indi-
viduals convicted of similar crimes differently."" A similar oppor-
tunity for different treatment exists in other jurisdictions. For ex-
ample, a youth indicted in the District of Columbia for an offense
not enumerated in the District of Columbia Code would be a "child"
subject to the special rights and immunities of a juvenile."' How-
ever, another youth, indicted for a serious crime under the prosecu-
torial discretion of the United States Attorney would automatically
be treated as an adult, despite the possibility that he will be con-
victed of a lesser crime than charged in the indictment.
The consequences of being denied juvenile jurisdiction in the Dis-
trict of Columbia Code are actually greater than in New York. The
commitment of the "child" under the juvenile act in the District of
Columbia can only last until the age of majority is reached, whereas
commitment in the adult criminal system could last significantly
longer."' In New York both the youthful offender and the ineligible
youth are treated in the adult criminal court. Thus, the differences
in length of commitment are not that great."13
What then is the basis for the differing conclusions reached by the
New York Court of Appeals and the courts of the other jurisdictions?
One possible distinction is that the juvenile statutes in other juris-
dictions do nothing more than determine the jurisdiction of the
court (juvenile or adult) based on the nature of the crime charged.'
Because such a vital determination must be made early in the judi-
cial process, the seriousness of the crime contained in the indict-
109. See text accompanying note 79 supra.
110. See People v. Goodwin, 49 App. Div. 2d 53, 57, 378 N.Y.S.2d 82, 87 (3d Dep't 1975)
(Greenblott, J., dissenting).
111. United States v. Bland, 472 F.2d 1329, 1339-40 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Wright, J., dis-
senting).
112. D.C. Code Encyl. § 16-2322(f) (West Supp. 1970). See United States v. Bland, 472
F.2d at 1337.
113. See Levine, The Youthful Offender Under the New York Criminal Procedure Law,
36 ALBANY L. REv. 241, 255 (1972).
114. See People v. Goodwin, 49 App. Div. 2d 53, 57, 378 N.Y.S.2d 82, 87 (3d Dep't
1975)(Greenblott, J., dissenting).
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ment is of great value in deciding which court will hear the case. But
this rationale is not applicable to New York. Children under sixteen
may be tried only in juvenile court,"' and children over sixteen are
handled in adult court."' Thus, youthful offender proceedings are
heard in the adult court system, and the determination as to youth-
ful offender status is not made until after conviction." 7
VI. Conclusion
In light of the court of appeals decision in Drummond, the 1975
amendment to the youthful offender statute appears to be in jeop-
ardy. An application of the court's reasoning forces the conclusion
that the court of appeals will find the new statute constitutionally
lacking. Although the new amendment relaxes the automatic exclu-
sion provision of the old statute, it continues to base eligibility solely
on the indictment. Such use of the indictment will probably be
rejected as a denial of due process.
John M. Tyd
115. See N.Y. FAM. Ct. Act § 712 (McKinney 1975), as amended, (McKinney Supp. 1976).
See also Note, Sending The Accused Juvenile To Adult Criminal Court: A Due Process
Analysis, 42 BROOKLYN L. REv. 309 n.3 (1975).
116. See N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT § 712 note at 557 (McKinney 1975).
117. See N.Y. CRaiM. PRoc. LAW §§ 720.10-.35 (McKinney 1971), as amended, (McKinney
Supp. 1976).
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